Leeway Research

Investment thesis 12 min

AI Data Centres Must Still Earn Their Cost of Capital

The first construction wave can be real without making every contract, credit facility and accelerator purchase equally valuable to shareholders.

The assessment is produced by a discussion among several models, with continuous fact-checking and research. Jump to the method

The AI build-out has created genuine demand for advanced chips, electricity and data-centre sites. It has not yet settled the harder question: whether the same end-customer dollar can service the stacked contracts, leases and loans that finance the first capacity wave. The distinction matters most where revenue is concentrated, assets depreciate quickly and refinancing must arrive before cash conversion is proven.

The Thesis at a Glance

  • Installed capacity is not the same as paid demand. The relevant measure is deduplicated end-customer spending after cloud, model and application providers have paid one another.
  • Backlog is a credit question as well as a revenue question. A signed contract supports valuation only if the counterparty, the termination terms and the cash-conversion timetable withstand a weaker funding market.
  • Equity absorbs the residual risk first. GPU collateral, special-purpose vehicles and long-dated infrastructure can distribute risk, but they cannot make a short-lived computing asset economically permanent.
  • The portfolio prefers roles with several buyers. Foundry capacity, grid and industrial systems, and embedded professional workflows can earn through a slower build-out; financed rental capacity needs the most favourable sequence.

Cash, not counted revenue

The test is whether unique users, enterprises and public buyers can fund the whole stack after internal payments are removed.

Contract quality becomes credit quality

Backlog, guarantees, lease terms and customer concentration determine whether an announced commitment can support a lender as well as an equity story.

The residual sits with equity

When utilisation, rental rates or useful lives disappoint, the loss allocation runs from equity through asset-backed credit before it reaches the durable site and power infrastructure.

Three Tests for the First Compute Wave

The allocation does not deny AI demand. It separates the cash ultimately paid by users from the contractual claims built on top of it, then asks who owns an asset when the first generation of hardware must be replaced.

  1. 01

    1. Count the end-customer payment once

    Application revenue, model revenue and cloud revenue are not additive when they arise from the same customer budget. A sound demand estimate removes internal transfers before comparing revenue with installed capital.

  2. 02

    2. Underwrite the counterparty behind the backlog

    A commitment is strongest when the payer has diversified cash flows, a clear delivery need and meaningful cancellation costs. The same headline is weaker when it depends on another funded AI company or an uncommenced project.

  3. 03

    3. Match the asset to its economic life

    Land, power interconnection and a specialised production process can serve several hardware generations. A rental fleet cannot assume the same durability without evidence on resale value, utilisation and upgrade economics.

The analysis

The investment case for AI infrastructure is often framed as a volume question: how many accelerators, megawatts and halls will be built. That framing is incomplete. The first wave is financed through several balance sheets at once. An application provider pays a model company; the model company pays a cloud provider; the cloud provider signs for equipment and capacity; a data-centre operator or a special-purpose vehicle raises debt against contracts that may ultimately depend on the same payer. Each invoice is valid. They are not independent sources of final demand.

This does not make the build-out fictitious. It makes cash-flow attribution decisive. A high-quality foundry, a grid connection or an industrial control system can be used by several customers and several compute generations. A financier of a concentrated GPU fleet needs a narrower set of assumptions to hold simultaneously: demand must arrive on time, the customer must pay, hardware must retain economic value and the next refinancing must be available at a tolerable rate.

The portfolio therefore avoids a universal view on AI hardware. It favours companies whose scarce capability is useful even if the first rental cohort earns modest returns. The negative positions concentrate on the parts of the stack where the market may be treating contractual volume as fully independent, durable cash generation.

Evidence

  • The Bank for International Settlements describes the AI infrastructure boom as being financed by borrowing that sits both on corporate balance sheets and outside them. A reported investment programme can therefore be larger than the debt line in the sponsor’s accounts.

    Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review: financing the AI infrastructure boom
  • Bloomberg’s map of AI financing shows companies investing in, buying from and supplying one another. A payment inside that circle is real revenue for the recipient, but it is not a new dollar from an outside customer.

    Bloomberg: AI circular deals
  • J.P. Morgan treats the data-centre build-out as a capital-markets financing task, with project debt raised alongside borrowing by the operating companies. The existence of the financing does not establish the return on the assets being financed.

    J.P. Morgan: financing AI infrastructure and data centres

The Argument

The demand calculation begins after internal transfers are removed

A customer payment can support several reported revenue lines as it moves through an application, a model provider and a cloud platform. Adding those lines produces a useful map of activity, but not a measure of final demand. The relevant economic question is whether the unique external payer base can ultimately support the return required on the capital commissioned across the stack.

This is a discipline, not a forecast of failure. Corporate software budgets, consumer subscriptions, advertising and public-sector use can expand materially. The point is that investment claims should be tested against the cash that leaves those buyers, rather than against every contractual hand-off that follows.

Evidence

  • Brookings estimates that roughly $9.6 trillion of commissioned AI infrastructure would require about $3.7 trillion of annual revenue by 2032 to earn a 10 percent unlevered return, assuming a 50 percent operating cash-flow margin. That figure is a revenue requirement, not a forecast of unique end-user spending.

    Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Brookings Institution, September 2026
  • The same author’s data-centre study separates the long-lived building and power connection from the equipment. Lenders to servers and accelerators usually finance them on shorter terms, often within five years, because that hardware depreciates and becomes obsolete faster than the site.

    Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Columbia Business School: data-centre economics
  • Reuters documented in July 2026 that companies were committing billions of dollars to AI infrastructure. Announced spending measures the build-out. It does not measure how much of that spending end customers have already funded with their own cash.

    Reuters, 22 July 2026: companies committing billions to AI infrastructure

Backlog changes character when the payer is also financed by the same build-out

A contract is most valuable when it survives the same funding test as the asset it is meant to support.

Long-term commitments can be economically robust. They are not interchangeable. A contract with an established enterprise customer, a disclosed guarantee and a real operational dependency differs from a chain of commitments among companies that are each extending capacity ahead of their own confirmed cash receipts. The difference is not visible in a single backlog number.

For investors, the useful work is contractual rather than thematic: identify the ultimate payer, the commencement date, termination rights, collateral, renewal logic and the consequences if a provider replaces rather than expands a GPU generation. The more these terms depend on one another, the less safely they should be capitalised as separate demand.

Evidence

  • S&P Global Ratings lowered Oracle to BBB− and brought roughly $260 billion of future lease commitments and $13 billion of unconditional purchase obligations, mainly for data-centre power, into the credit assessment. The backlog is therefore already being read as a claim on the balance sheet.

    S&P Global Ratings: Oracle credit research
  • Reuters reported on 18 September 2026 that about $18 billion of Oracle-linked data-centre debt was under pressure in the market. A large remaining-performance-obligation figure had not, by itself, kept the related debt at par.

    Reuters, 18 September 2026: pressure on Oracle-linked data-centre debt
  • Reuters described Oracle’s AI infrastructure plan as a high-stakes decision for the credit rating. Cloud revenue can grow while the lease and power commitments still change the risk borne by creditors and shareholders.

    Reuters, 4 August 2026: Oracle’s ratings gamble on its AI strategy

Asset-backed finance does not remove residual-value risk

Special-purpose vehicles and asset-backed structures can match capital to a physical project and protect senior lenders through covenants, reserves and contracted payments. They do not settle the economic life of the asset. GPUs can retain useful value for longer than a sceptic expects, but that value depends on technical relevance, power costs, secondary demand and the cost of the next generation.

The distinction is especially important where a site, power connection and building have a much longer life than the first hardware installed inside them. A lender may have recourse to several assets; an equity holder still bears the outcome when the return on the combined project falls below its cost of capital. This is why an infrastructure boom can leave durable sites intact while repricing the most leveraged layer.

Evidence

Own scarce capability; treat financed capacity as a claim on a sequence

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing combines process qualification, yield learning and customer relationships that remain necessary across hardware cycles. Hitachi supplies industrial systems and grid-related capability where the customer set extends far beyond one AI programme. RELX owns embedded professional workflows whose value rests on data, distribution and customer habits rather than on rented compute.

CoreWeave, Oracle and SK hynix are not equivalent shorts and should not be treated as a blanket rejection of AI demand. They represent different tests: financing and utilisation for rental capacity, credit and off-balance-sheet commitments for a platform buyer, and the duration of a memory upcycle priced for unusually strong accelerator demand. Each position requires defined risk and a separate evidence standard.

Evidence

Current Market Valuation

The focus is not on what will happen, but on what valuation current prices already assume, and where those assumptions would fail.

The likely regime is uneven monetisation. AI capacity keeps growing, yet the return on the first projects spreads unevenly between the parties that own scarce production, power access, workflow distribution and financing capacity. Equity markets can initially value all of them as a single build-out trade. Credit terms, utilisation data and replacement cycles eventually force a distinction.

This does not require a collapse in AI spending. It requires a more ordinary capital cycle: some projects clear their cost of capital, some contracts are refinanced at lower returns and some equipment earns less once supply broadens. The durable long positions should be assessed on their own industrial and workflow economics, not on the continuation of a single accelerator shortage.

Evidence

The Investment Selection

The selection separates durable bottlenecks and workflow ownership from financed compute capacity and the most cycle-sensitive component exposure. Company ratings on the cards are independent Leeway assessments; the position notes identify the evidence needed for the thesis and are not personalised investment advice.

The Business-Rating scores the quality of the business model, independent of the share price. The Market-Fit-Rating tests eighteen fundamental figures for how well the company currently fits the market; a negative reading implies expected negative performance. The Cycle-Rating places the valuation in the stock’s own history: a higher figure means the shares are historically cheaper. The Leeway-Score combines the three in equal parts. How the ratings are calculated

The recommendations since publication

Not enough trading sessions have elapsed since publication to compute a consistent performance series.

Durable production and infrastructure bottlenecks

Long

These positions have scarce capabilities that can remain valuable across several customers and hardware generations.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.

2330.TW · Technology · 64183bn TWD

Long

Role in the thesis: Long exposure to advanced process manufacturing and qualification that remains necessary regardless of which cloud, model or rental provider earns the highest return.

Investment case: Yield learning, customer trust and scarce leading-edge capacity are durable constraints. The company can benefit from AI demand without relying on one financed compute operator.

Position and invalidation

Position: Treat TSMC as the manufacturing bottleneck in a diversified AI allocation, not as a hedge against all semiconductor cyclicality.

What to watch: Monitor leading-edge utilisation, customer concentration, capital-expenditure discipline and the pace of advanced-node capacity additions.

What would invalidate it: The case weakens if leading-edge utilisation falls for several quarters while pricing and return on invested capital deteriorate.

Principal risk: A technology-cycle correction, customer inventory adjustment, geopolitical risk or accelerated competitive progress could outweigh the relative-quality argument.

Leeway Rating

General scores - independent of the research topic

Leeway Score56.1/100

  • Business Rating 60.0
  • Market-Fit Rating Trend+190.5
  • Cycle Rating 17.9

Check the full analysis

Hitachi, Ltd.

6501.TSE · Industrials · 24721bn JPY

Long

Role in the thesis: Long exposure to industrial systems, electrification and project-delivery capability that benefit from grid and data-centre investment without depending on the first GPU-rental cohort.

Investment case: The business addresses multiple infrastructure budgets. Its value lies in installed relationships and execution, rather than in the residual value of one generation of compute hardware.

Position and invalidation

Position: Use Hitachi as a diversified industrial-capability position, not as a pure data-centre proxy.

What to watch: Monitor order quality, margin conversion, grid and digital-infrastructure demand, and working-capital discipline.

What would invalidate it: The case weakens if order growth depends increasingly on low-margin projects or if cash conversion deteriorates as the backlog grows.

Principal risk: Industrial spending, project execution, Japanese currency movements and a valuation that already reflects strong demand can all limit returns.

Leeway Rating

General scores - independent of the research topic

Leeway Score49.4/100

  • Business Rating 43.0
  • Market-Fit Rating Trend−2675.7
  • Cycle Rating 29.5

Check the full analysis

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Three Possible Outcomes

The probabilities are working assumptions for portfolio construction, not forecasts.

PathWeightWhat happens
Base: demand proves real, returns separate 50% AI usage expands, but contracts and utilisation differentiate. Foundry, power and workflow positions retain support; some financed capacity reprices as the cost of credit and hardware replacement becomes visible.
Favourable: cash conversion arrives early 25% Enterprise and consumer spending grows quickly enough to support capacity commitments. Contract commencements, utilisation and refinancing all improve, reducing the case for negative positions and extending the HBM cycle.
Adverse: a financing test exposes overlap 25% Customers delay or resize commitments, older hardware rental economics soften and lenders demand wider spreads or stronger guarantees. The infrastructure continues to operate, but equity in the most leveraged layer absorbs the reset.

Counter-arguments and Risks

The primary risk factors for this analysis. These arguments result from stress-testing our fundamental assumptions.

The strongest counter-case is straightforward: AI demand may compound fast enough that current capacity remains scarce, contracted revenue converts cleanly to cash and hardware retains resale value longer than sceptics expect. In that setting, the financing structures are an efficient way to build useful infrastructure, not evidence of excess.

There is also a company-specific objection. Oracle has a large installed software base and can finance a cloud expansion through more than the AI contracts examined here. CoreWeave may diversify its customers and prove that specialised GPU operations earn durable returns. A disciplined view must test those outcomes against reported cash conversion rather than dismiss them in advance.

Evidence

Unresolved Market Factors

Open questions that cannot be conclusively answered using currently available market data.

The central uncertainty is timing. Capacity is committed years before the cash profile of a new AI workload is fully observable. A project can therefore be rational for a customer and still deliver a mediocre return for the equity investor who financed it at the wrong point in the cycle.

The second uncertainty is asset life. Accelerators can be reused, repurposed or sold, and data-centre facilities can outlive the first hardware cohort. The analysis is not a claim that every GPU becomes worthless. It asks whether the assumptions used in financing and valuation remain prudent when utilisation, replacement cycles and credit availability are no longer uniformly favourable.

Evidence

The Evidence That Matters

These observations are more useful than aggregate announcements about AI capital expenditure.

  • Deduplicated evidence of end-customer spending across enterprise software, consumer services, advertising and public-sector deployments.
  • The identity, credit quality, commencement dates and cancellation rights of the counterparties behind major capacity commitments.
  • Utilisation, realised rental rates and renewal terms for current and prior GPU generations.
  • Credit spreads, covenant changes, equity raises and the price of refinancing for asset-backed compute structures.
  • Capital expenditure, lease commitments and free-cash-flow conversion at major cloud and platform buyers.
  • HBM pricing, inventories, supplier capacity additions and the pace at which accelerator demand reaches end deployment.
  • Grid-connection queues, power-contract terms and the share of data-centre investment that is reusable across hardware generations.

What Would Change the View

The thesis should be reduced or abandoned if these developments persist.

  • Independent end-customer spending grows fast enough to support the combined infrastructure return without relying on overlapping internal revenue claims.
  • Financed compute providers convert diverse, long-term customer commitments into sustained operating cash flow while refinancing costs decline.
  • Older accelerator fleets retain high utilisation and economic rental value through the next major hardware transition.
  • The selected durable positions lose pricing, utilisation or workflow retention even as the broader AI infrastructure cycle remains healthy.

How this analysis is produced

The assessment is produced in several steps. Independent model families answer the same question separately and then attack the results. What you read here has survived several rounds.

  1. Two independent first theses. The same opening question goes to several model families that cannot see one another. Disagreements are kept, not averaged away.
  2. Dated evidence. Every claim that depends on facts is broken into individual search questions and answered with dated, sourced web research. Question, answer, sources and timestamp are logged and remain traceable.
  3. Adversarial review. Several review roles attack the thesis from different angles: one hunts for the strongest refutation, one for the awkward edge cases, one tests whether a path from thesis to share price exists at all, one checks the timeline for contradictions. Each role raises its own questions, which are again answered with evidence.
  4. Merge, then the next round. The surviving theses are merged into one and attacked again. The counter-position and the unresolved tension on this page come out of that step. They were not bolted on afterwards to look balanced.
  5. Back to the start. The process runs again until there is a clear result and a list of tradable companies with structural advantages.

Any analysis can be wrong. That is why the falsification criteria and the counter-position sit on the same page as the thesis, not in the small print.

The numbers shown against individual companies do not come from this process. The Business-Rating scores business-model quality, the Market-Fit-Rating eighteen fundamental figures against the current market, the Cycle-Rating the valuation against the stock’s own history. They are documented under the Leeway scores.

Questions Investors Ask

Does this thesis predict that AI spending will collapse?

No. It distinguishes useful and growing AI demand from the return earned by each balance sheet financing the first capacity wave. Spending can rise while returns separate sharply between foundries, infrastructure owners, workflow providers and financed rental capacity.

Why can reported AI revenue overstate final demand?

The same end-customer payment can appear as revenue at several layers when an application provider pays a model provider and the model provider pays a cloud host. Those payments are real, but they should not be added together when assessing the cash available to support all installed capital.

What would make the short positions wrong?

Sustained cash conversion, diversified counterparties, lower refinancing costs and durable economics for older hardware would materially weaken the case. The positions concern specific financing and cycle risks, not a general judgement that the companies cannot execute.

Evaluate the selected companies with the three Leeway ratings

The Business Rating assesses business-model quality, the Market-Fit Rating evaluates fundamentals in the current market regime, and the Cycle Rating places valuation in the company’s history. Use Leeway’s general equity analysis to examine each selected company.

Company Valuation and Fundamental Analysis

The data is recalculated on a weekly basis and depends on the current market value of the company and the balance sheet figures of the annual financial statements. The market value changes continuously with price changes, the balance sheets are created annually and change the valuation massively. The time of the annual financial statements and the metrics used can be viewed under "Metrics". Further information on how the analyses work can be found as tooltips directly on the analyses as well as in our explanations.

General

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