Recommended as Stock of the Week on September 21, 2026

Uniper: The State-Owned Utility Learning to Profit Again – But Not Yet Celebrating

TickerUN0.XETRA
Recommended Price49.45 EUR
Current Price 49.45 EUR
Uniper SE – stock chart

Scores at time of recommendation (September 21, 2026)

Leeway Score
15/100
Fair
Business Rating
-48/100
Poor
Market-Fit Rating
61/100
Excellent
Cycle Rating
31/100
Poor

More about our scores in Help

5-year stock timeline

2026 — H1 2026 results and ongoing asset disposals

Uniper reported a strong first half of 2026 with core profit nearly doubling year-on-year and continued progress on selling non-core assets required under the 2022 state-aid approval. Investors shifted perception from "crisis survivor" to a company executing a state-backed restructuring, improving cash generation and shedding assets to normalize operations and comply with EU conditions. Core profit nearly doubled in H1 2026 [2]. Uniper agreed to sell its 20% stake in the OPAL gas pipeline in September 2026 as part of the asset disposal programme [6].

2025-03-11 — Repayment of state claim completed

Uniper settled repayment obligations to the Federal Republic of Germany of approximately €2.6 billion in full on 11 March 2025. This obligation had been determined in the 2024 consolidated financial statements. Repaying this amount was widely read as evidence that Uniper's post-crisis performance had materially improved and that the company could begin disentangling from emergency support. Market narrative turned toward stabilization and normalization [8].

2024 — Improved operating performance and post-crisis obligations

Uniper published 2024 consolidated financial statements that quantified repayment obligations to the Federal Republic under the EU state-aid decision and reflected recovery from the acute 2022 gas crisis. Investors increasingly viewed Uniper as moving from an emergency case requiring state support toward a restructured utility with clearer cash-flow prospects. Focus shifted to asset sales and deleveraging required by EU approval. The 2024 consolidated financial statements identified repayment obligations of approximately €2.6 billion [8].

2023 — Operational strain and ongoing restructuring

Throughout 2023 Uniper continued to face elevated costs from procuring replacement gas after Russian deliveries ceased. The company implemented further restructuring measures and began preparing asset disposals demanded under the 2022 stabilization agreement and EU approval. Market perception was that Uniper remained fragile but operationally stabilizing under state ownership. Investors focused on execution risk around disposals and the pace of recovery in earnings after heavy losses in 2022. Regulatory framework and state support terms from late-2022 remained relevant; EU approval required Uniper to pursue disposals and restructuring [3][14].

2022-12-21 — Federal Government completes takeover

The Federal Government completed the recapitalisation framework and became the principal owner of Uniper with approximately 99% stake after a capital increase. Fortum completed the sale of its Uniper shares to the German State and received about €0.5 billion for its stake. Investor perception shifted sharply as Uniper moved from private/majority-Fortum ownership to being effectively state-owned, ending the immediate insolvency threat but removing typical minority-shareholder upside while imposing restrictions such as bonus and dividend bans and EU conditionality around asset disposals. The takeover followed a capital increase at a nominal value of €1.70 per share; the Federal Government thereafter held roughly 99% of Uniper [1][3][4][13].

2022-07-22 and 2022-09-21 — Germany announces and expands bailout package

An initial stabilisation package was announced on 22 July 2022 with the state to take approximately 30% stake and capital and liquidity measures up to several billion euros. By 21 September 2022 the package was adapted and expanded because Uniper's capital needs rose sharply after Nord Stream-1 flows stopped, culminating in the state's decision to acquire approximately 99% via a larger recapitalisation. Markets moved from shock to decisive state intervention as Uniper went from a distressed utility at risk of collapse to a state-backed company. Perception became dominated by systemic importance regarding security of gas and electricity supply rather than pure commercial outlook; investors priced in dilution, state control, and conditionality. The July stabilisation included subscription of approximately 157 million new ordinary shares at nominal €1.70 per share with the German State to take approximately 30%, and availability of up to €7.7 billion in further capital via mandatory convertibles and KfW liquidity facilities. By September the plan was adapted to buy Fortum's stake for €1.70 per share and raise capital so the Federation would hold approximately 99% of shares [5][7][11][12].

2021 — Pre-crisis commercial performance

Prior to the 2022 crisis, Uniper operated as a major European gas importer and power-generation group with Fortum (Finland) as majority shareholder at around 80% before dilution. Investors regarded Uniper as a vertically integrated energy supplier exposed to gas price and supply risk but with scale in trading and generation. Fortum's ownership implied strategic backing from a Nordic parent. Uniper's business included significant import exposure to Russian gas and trading and generation assets [7][9].

Key Points

From recommendation (September 21, 2026)

  • H1 2026: EBITDA up 88% to EUR 711m, net income EUR 388m, full-year guidance confirmed and slightly raised (EBITDA EUR 1.1–1.3bn, net income EUR 500–600m)
  • Balance sheet substantially strengthened: net cash position of approximately 4.5 billion EUR, equity ratio increased from 18.6% (2023) to 33.1% (2025)
  • Long-term supply security: Gas contract with Equinor for more than 30 TWh/year from 2027 to 2041, third international LNG offtake agreement with Ksi Lisims
  • Valuation moderate relative to peers: P/E around 12.2x, price-to-sales 0.34x, ROE 14.7%, operating margin at 0.17% though still razor-thin.
  • Federal government holds approximately 99% of shares – stability anchor, while talks progress on role in gas storage filling

Investment Thesis

From recommendation (September 21, 2026)

Uniper has stabilized operationally. After narrowly avoiding collapse in 2022, the company now presents a profit and dividend story alongside a comfortable net cash position that creates room for both investment and shareholder returns. The headline growth rates—revenue up 35.5% and earnings up 20.9%—look impressive at first glance, but soften considerably when you examine the operating margin, which sits below one percent. Uniper remains a thin-margin commodity business built on high turnover, not the high-margin energy company the narrative sometimes suggests. The recently secured long-term contracts with Equinor and Ksi Lisims show deliberate work on supply diversification and positioning beyond Russian gas, which is strategically sound but won't move the needle meaningfully until 2027. Near-complete state ownership provides stability and explains why the government is currently negotiating with Uniper over gas storage operations—that can provide near-term support, though it also makes clear that Uniper's strategy remains tethered to energy policy objectives rather than pure commercial logic. The stock reads less as a classic turnaround play and more as a tactical holding for investors who weight balance sheet strength and supply security above growth narratives.

Key risks and downside factors

Uniper SE operates as a German energy company with three main business areas: power generation, global gas midstream operations and trading, and energy supply. Its competitive set consists primarily of large European integrated utilities alongside specialized gas-focused energy firms, all competing across generation, wholesale gas trading, and renewables development. The company faces material exposure to commodity price swings and wholesale gas volatility, regulatory and political intervention across Germany and Europe, energy transition risks including potential asset stranding and substantial capital requirements for decarbonization, and counterparty and market liquidity risks inherent to its trading operations [8], [3].

  • Wholesale power and natural gas prices are driving substantial fluctuations in both generation margins and trading results.
  • Regulatory and political intervention in Germany and Europe—through market rules, subsidies, asset nationalization, and ownership limitations—carries real capacity to shift company profitability in ways that traditional financial models often underestimate [1], [2]. The EU's regulatory framework has grown denser over the past decade. Energy price caps, carbon pricing mechanisms, and sector-specific rules reshape margins faster than quarterly earnings cycles. Germany's Energiewende policy, for instance, created both winners and structural headwinds depending on where a company sits in the energy transition [3]. What looks like a stable utility today may face forced asset sales or stranded investments tomorrow. Subsidy regimes matter more than most investors acknowledge. State support for green technology, manufacturing reshoring, and infrastructure projects can compress valuations of unsubsidized competitors or inflate valuations of favored sectors. The timing and scope of these programs shift with political cycles, creating volatility that doesn't show up in historical beta [4]. Asset nationalization or forced divestitures remain low-probability but not zero-probability events in Europe. Hungary and Poland have tested regulatory boundaries. Germany has used energy emergency powers. These aren't just headline risks—they're structural costs embedded in certain holdings, particularly in utilities, telecoms, and critical infrastructure [5]. Ownership limitations—whether through golden shares, foreign investment screening, or sector-specific caps—can trap capital in underperforming assets or prevent portfolio optimization. A company might be fundamentally sound but trapped in a jurisdiction where regulatory barriers prevent the consolidation or exit that would unlock value [6]. The practical implication: German and European holdings require a second layer of analysis beyond traditional financial metrics. Political risk isn't noise here. It's a material variable that compounds over time.
  • Energy Transition Risk: Capital Requirements for Decarbonizing Thermal Generation and Stranded Fossil Asset Exposure Thermal power generation faces a structural shift as energy systems decarbonize. Utilities operating coal, gas, and oil-fired plants confront two concurrent pressures: the capital intensity of replacing aging thermal capacity with renewables and storage, and the risk that existing fossil infrastructure becomes economically obsolete before full asset life recovery [1]. The financial burden falls unevenly. Operators with thermal-heavy portfolios need substantial capital deployment to build renewable capacity while maintaining grid reliability during transition. This creates a timing problem—retiring thermal assets before they've generated sufficient returns while simultaneously funding new infrastructure strains balance sheets. The capital requirement is not trivial; decarbonizing a legacy thermal fleet typically requires reinvestment across generation, transmission, and storage layers. Stranded asset risk emerges when regulatory, technological, or market shifts render fossil capacity uneconomic before its accounting life expires. Early retirement accelerates write-downs. A plant designed for thirty years of operation but retired in fifteen leaves the remaining capital unrecovered. This risk concentrates in regions with aggressive decarbonization timelines, aging thermal fleets, and limited access to capital markets. The asymmetry matters for investors. Utilities with diversified generation portfolios and strong capital access can manage the transition. Those with concentrated thermal exposure, weaker balance sheets, or operating in jurisdictions with rapid policy shifts face material stranded asset exposure and potential dividend pressure as capital redirects toward transition investments.
  • Counterparty and Liquidity Risk in Commodity Trading and Extreme Market Stress Commodity trading introduces two distinct but interconnected risk dimensions that merit separate examination, though they often surface together during periods of market dislocation. Counterparty risk emerges from the fundamental structure of commodity markets. Most physical and derivative transactions require a counterparty to fulfill obligations—delivery, payment, or settlement. When a counterparty faces financial distress or operational failure, the entire transaction chain can fracture. In commodity markets specifically, this risk compounds because many transactions involve leverage, extended settlement periods, and cross-border complications. A major trader's default doesn't merely affect bilateral exposure; it can trigger cascading failures through interconnected supply chains and financing arrangements [8], [3]. Liquidity risk operates differently but with equal consequence. Commodity markets vary dramatically in depth and resilience. While crude oil and natural gas maintain reasonable trading volumes across most conditions, many agricultural commodities and specialty metals can become illiquid with surprising speed. During market stress, bid-ask spreads widen, transaction sizes shrink, and exit becomes difficult precisely when positions need to be reduced. The relationship between counterparty and liquidity risk becomes critical here: as counterparty concerns mount, liquidity typically evaporates, making it harder to hedge or unwind exposure. Extreme market stress—whether from geopolitical shocks, financial contagion, or supply disruptions—tends to expose the fragility in both dimensions simultaneously. Positions that appeared reasonable under normal volatility become impossible to exit at acceptable prices, while counterparty creditworthiness deteriorates as margin calls and financing pressures intensify. The combination creates a feedback loop where illiquidity forces positions to remain open longer, increasing counterparty exposure at precisely the moment when credit quality is declining.

Competitive landscape

Uniper operates as a major European power generator and gas importer with business lines spanning thermal generation, gas midstream and wholesale trading, plus an expanding footprint in renewables and energy services. The competitive landscape includes large integrated European utilities and traders such as RWE, E.ON, EDF and its subsidiaries, Engie, and Vattenfall, alongside regional gas operators and independent power producers. The core risks facing Uniper stem from commodity price swings, regulatory and political shifts affecting Europe's gas and power markets, counterparty and trading exposures, and the longer-term pressure from decarbonization trends that threaten the viability of fossil-generation assets.

Private competitors

  • Local/regional independent power producers and merchant gas traders (various private firms)

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Catalysts

From recommendation (September 21, 2026)

  • Q3 2026 Results with Potential Further Refinement of Full-Year Guidance
  • Progress and Timing of LNG Deliveries from Canada (Ksi Lisims) and Equinor Contract Starting 2027
  • Concretization of investment decisions, including data centers at power plant locations
  • Clarity on the Role in State-Coordinated Gas Storage Filling
  • Further Communication on Dividend Policy Following Resumption of Distributions

Analysis

From recommendation (September 21, 2026)

The fundamental demand for electricity and gas is undeniable and provides Uniper with a structurally stable demand base. Industry, municipal utilities, and households cannot avoid energy, which gives the business a certain baseline resilience. This resilience shows up in the hard numbers: cash position, equity ratio, and earnings growth are noticeably better than two years ago. What doesn't automatically translate, though, is the high societal need into high profitability. The operating margin remains near zero, and results fluctuate sharply with energy prices, hedging outcomes, and regulatory interventions. There's also structural headwind from decarbonization: tightening ESG requirements, growing political pressure, and a transition toward renewables and hydrogen that lags peers in the sector all strain the long-term legitimacy of the business model. The tight interweaving with the state—currently visible in discussions around gas storage replenishment—provides short-term stability but also deepens dependence on political rather than purely business decisions. The company stands on solid operational and balance sheet footing again, yet its strategic direction between supply security and the energy transition remains unsettled.

Performance Figures of Uniper SE

in EUR

1M High / Low
50.60 / 44.45
52W High / Low
56.20 / 27.30
5Y High / Low
79.01 / 2.09
1M
-1.49%
3M
+8.41%
6M
+17.60%
1Y
+46.08%
3Y
-54.53%
5Y
-93.57%

Relative Performance vs Benchmarks

PeriodUniper SE vs DAX vs S&P 500 (SPY)
1M -1.49% +1.84% -2.90%
3M +8.41% +8.32% +4.51%
6M +17.60% +11.98% +2.36%
1Y +46.08% +42.98% +28.39%
3Y -54.53% -119.61% -142.61%
5Y -93.57% -158.91% -183.81%

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Historical valuation trends

How the company’s key valuation ratios (P/E, P/S, P/B and P/CF) have evolved over time compared to today.

PeriodP/E RatioP/S RatioP/B RatioP/CF Ratio
Current11.50.31.612.5
1Y ago-42.80.21.3-8.3
3Y ago1.40.33.217.3
5Y ago-2.80.12.35.1

Frequently Asked Questions

From recommendation (September 21, 2026)

Is Uniper SE a good investment?

Uniper SE has a Leeway Score of 14.8/100, which is rated as Fair. The Leeway Score combines business quality, fundamental evaluation, and valuation cycle into a comprehensive assessment. A higher score indicates stronger investment quality based on AI-powered fundamental analysis.

What does Uniper SE do?

Uniper SE is a company characterized by the following investment thesis: Uniper SE operates as an energy company in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the rest of Europe, and internationally. It operates through Green Generation, Flexible Generation, and Greener Commodities segments. The Green Generation segment operates renewable and low carbon power generation facilities, including hydroelectric, nuclear, wind, and solar power plants. The Flexible Generation segment operates gas-fired power plants, such as combined-cycle gas turbine power plants, coal, and oiled-fired power plants; as well as the provision of energy services. The Greener Commodities segment optimizes and sells natural gas to distributors, large industrial customers, power plant operators, and international energy markets. This segment also engages in gas storage operations; infrastructure investments; import, trade, and process or store renewable and low carbon fuels comprising hydrogen, biomethane, and ammonia; procurement of fuels; trading emission allowances; marketing and optimizing electricity generated; and trading green certificates for the supply of green energy. The company was founded in 1894 and is headquartered in Düsseldorf, Germany. Uniper SE is a subsidiary of UBG Uniper Beteiligungsholding GmbH. Uniper SE operates in the Utilities / Utilities - Regulated Gas industry is based in Germany employs around 7,094 people. Uniper SE recently reported revenue of about 61.22B EUR, a profit margin of 2.75%, return on equity of 14.73%, a market capitalisation around 19.37B EUR, valuation multiples of roughly 11.5x earnings, 0.3x sales, 1.6x book value. Analyst consensus currently expects earnings per share of around 1.75 EUR with year‑over‑year growth of 23.16%. Uniper SE has an ongoing dividend policy and pays around 0.72 EUR per share (1.53% yield).

What are the key metrics for UN0.XETRA?

Key metrics for UN0.XETRA include valuation (P/E 12.2, P/S 0.3, P/B 1.7), profitability (profit margin 2.75%, ROE 14.73%), and growth (revenue 35.50%, earnings 20.90%). Market capitalization is 20.53B EUR. These metrics give an overview of the company's financial performance and valuation.

How has Uniper SE's stock price performed?

Uniper SE's stock has returned – over 1 year, – over 3 years, and – over 5 years. Performance can vary depending on market conditions and company developments.

How is UN0.XETRA valued?

UN0.XETRA has the following valuation metrics: P/E Ratio: 12.2, P/S Ratio: 0.3, P/B Ratio: 1.7. These metrics help assess whether the stock is fairly valued compared to its fundamentals.

What are the growth catalysts for Uniper SE?

The key growth catalysts for Uniper SE are:
  • Q3 2026 Results with Potential Further Refinement of Full-Year Guidance
  • Progress and Timing of LNG Deliveries from Canada (Ksi Lisims) and Equinor Contract Starting 2027
  • Concretization of investment decisions, including data centers at power plant locations
  • Clarity on the Role in State-Coordinated Gas Storage Filling
  • Further Communication on Dividend Policy Following Resumption of Distributions
These factors can positively influence the company's future growth and performance.

What are the key risks when investing in UN0.XETRA?

Key risks for UN0.XETRA include: Uniper SE operates as a German energy company with three main business areas: power generation, global gas midstream operations and trading, and energy supply. Its competitive set consists primarily of large European integrated utilities alongside specialized gas-focused energy firms, all competing across generation, wholesale gas trading, and renewables development. The company faces material exposure to commodity price swings and wholesale gas volatility, regulatory and political intervention across Germany and Europe, energy transition risks including potential asset stranding and substantial capital requirements for decarbonization, and counterparty and market liquidity risks inherent to its trading operations [8, 3, 21].
  • Wholesale power and natural gas prices are driving substantial fluctuations in both generation margins and trading results.
  • Regulatory and political intervention in Germany and Europe—through market rules, subsidies, asset nationalization, and ownership limitations—carries real capacity to shift company profitability in ways that traditional financial models often underestimate [1, 2]. The EU's regulatory framework has grown denser over the past decade. Energy price caps, carbon pricing mechanisms, and sector-specific rules reshape margins faster than quarterly earnings cycles. Germany's Energiewende policy, for instance, created both winners and structural headwinds depending on where a company sits in the energy transition [3]. What looks like a stable utility today may face forced asset sales or stranded investments tomorrow. Subsidy regimes matter more than most investors acknowledge. State support for green technology, manufacturing reshoring, and infrastructure projects can compress valuations of unsubsidized competitors or inflate valuations of favored sectors. The timing and scope of these programs shift with political cycles, creating volatility that doesn't show up in historical beta [4]. Asset nationalization or forced divestitures remain low-probability but not zero-probability events in Europe. Hungary and Poland have tested regulatory boundaries. Germany has used energy emergency powers. These aren't just headline risks—they're structural costs embedded in certain holdings, particularly in utilities, telecoms, and critical infrastructure [5]. Ownership limitations—whether through golden shares, foreign investment screening, or sector-specific caps—can trap capital in underperforming assets or prevent portfolio optimization. A company might be fundamentally sound but trapped in a jurisdiction where regulatory barriers prevent the consolidation or exit that would unlock value [6]. The practical implication: German and European holdings require a second layer of analysis beyond traditional financial metrics. Political risk isn't noise here. It's a material variable that compounds over time.
  • Energy Transition Risk: Capital Requirements for Decarbonizing Thermal Generation and Stranded Fossil Asset Exposure Thermal power generation faces a structural shift as energy systems decarbonize. Utilities operating coal, gas, and oil-fired plants confront two concurrent pressures: the capital intensity of replacing aging thermal capacity with renewables and storage, and the risk that existing fossil infrastructure becomes economically obsolete before full asset life recovery [1]. The financial burden falls unevenly. Operators with thermal-heavy portfolios need substantial capital deployment to build renewable capacity while maintaining grid reliability during transition. This creates a timing problem—retiring thermal assets before they've generated sufficient returns while simultaneously funding new infrastructure strains balance sheets. The capital requirement is not trivial; decarbonizing a legacy thermal fleet typically requires reinvestment across generation, transmission, and storage layers. Stranded asset risk emerges when regulatory, technological, or market shifts render fossil capacity uneconomic before its accounting life expires. Early retirement accelerates write-downs. A plant designed for thirty years of operation but retired in fifteen leaves the remaining capital unrecovered. This risk concentrates in regions with aggressive decarbonization timelines, aging thermal fleets, and limited access to capital markets. The asymmetry matters for investors. Utilities with diversified generation portfolios and strong capital access can manage the transition. Those with concentrated thermal exposure, weaker balance sheets, or operating in jurisdictions with rapid policy shifts face material stranded asset exposure and potential dividend pressure as capital redirects toward transition investments.
  • Counterparty and Liquidity Risk in Commodity Trading and Extreme Market Stress Commodity trading introduces two distinct but interconnected risk dimensions that merit separate examination, though they often surface together during periods of market dislocation. Counterparty risk emerges from the fundamental structure of commodity markets. Most physical and derivative transactions require a counterparty to fulfill obligations—delivery, payment, or settlement. When a counterparty faces financial distress or operational failure, the entire transaction chain can fracture. In commodity markets specifically, this risk compounds because many transactions involve leverage, extended settlement periods, and cross-border complications. A major trader's default doesn't merely affect bilateral exposure; it can trigger cascading failures through interconnected supply chains and financing arrangements [8, 3, 21]. Liquidity risk operates differently but with equal consequence. Commodity markets vary dramatically in depth and resilience. While crude oil and natural gas maintain reasonable trading volumes across most conditions, many agricultural commodities and specialty metals can become illiquid with surprising speed. During market stress, bid-ask spreads widen, transaction sizes shrink, and exit becomes difficult precisely when positions need to be reduced. The relationship between counterparty and liquidity risk becomes critical here: as counterparty concerns mount, liquidity typically evaporates, making it harder to hedge or unwind exposure. Extreme market stress—whether from geopolitical shocks, financial contagion, or supply disruptions—tends to expose the fragility in both dimensions simultaneously. Positions that appeared reasonable under normal volatility become impossible to exit at acceptable prices, while counterparty creditworthiness deteriorates as margin calls and financing pressures intensify. The combination creates a feedback loop where illiquidity forces positions to remain open longer, increasing counterparty exposure at precisely the moment when credit quality is declining.
Investors should consider these risk factors carefully before making an investment decision.

Who are the main competitors of Uniper SE?

Uniper SE competes with several listed peers in its sector. Uniper operates as a major European power generator and gas importer with business lines spanning thermal generation, gas midstream and wholesale trading, plus an expanding footprint in renewables and energy services. The competitive landscape includes large integrated European utilities and traders such as RWE, E.ON, EDF and its subsidiaries, Engie, and Vattenfall, alongside regional gas operators and independent power producers. The core risks facing Uniper stem from commodity price swings, regulatory and political shifts affecting Europe's gas and power markets, counterparty and trading exposures, and the longer-term pressure from decarbonization trends that threaten the viability of fossil-generation assets.
  • RWE AG (RWE.DE)
  • E.ON SE (EOAN.DE)
  • Engie SA (ENGI.PA)
  • Iberdrola SA (IBE.MC)
  • EDF (Électricité de France) / EDF Group (EDF.PA)
  • EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EBK.DE)
These competitors influence pricing power, growth opportunities and relative valuation.

When does Uniper SE report earnings?

Uniper SE's next earnings report date is November 10, 2026.

Key Metrics

From recommendation (September 21, 2026)

Market Capitalization
20.53B EUR
P/E Ratio
12.20
Analyst Target Price
37.50 EUR

Valuation Metrics

P/S Ratio
0.34
P/B Ratio
1.67

Profitability Metrics

Profit Margin
2.75%
Operating Margin
0.17%
Return on Equity
14.73%
Return on Assets
1.43%

Growth Metrics

Revenue Growth
35.50%
Earnings Growth
20.90%

Dividend history

Long-term record of paid dividends (amount per share and dividend yield at the time of payment).

YearDividendYield at paymentAvg. yield
20260.72 EUR1.36%2.83%
20221.40 EUR0.29%
202127.40 EUR4.51%
202023.00 EUR4.42%
201918.00 EUR3.42%
201814.80 EUR2.74%
201711.00 EUR3.09%

Earnings history & estimates

Historical earnings performance shows how consistently the company meets or exceeds analyst expectations. Forward estimates provide insight into expected profitability and growth trajectory.

Historical earnings performance

56.8%
Beat estimate
37.8%
Miss estimate
+355.63%
Avg surprise when beat
-115.63%
Avg surprise when miss

Reports analyzed: 37

Upcoming earnings report

November 10, 2026
Next earnings date

Analyst estimates for upcoming periods

Next year
December 31, 2027
Consensus1.75
Range1.50 – 2.00
3 analysts
Est. growth vs prior: 23.16%
Revisions: 7d ↑2 ↓0 · 30d ↑2 ↓1
Next quarter
September 30, 2025
Consensus0.30
Range0.30 – 0.30
1 analysts
Est. growth vs prior: -41.85%

Key financial figures

All figures in EUR

Selected income statement, balance sheet and cash flow figures. Annual and quarterly, based on reported IFRS/GAAP financials.

20252024202320222021
Revenue60.95B69.64B107.92B274.12B162.97B
Operating income (EBIT)365.00M1.10B-665.00M-4.99B3.97B
Net income1.40B297.00M6.31B-19.00B-4.17B
Free cash flow-1.59B984.00M5.99B-15.60B3.04B
Total assets35.87B38.49B54.96B146.92B157.48B
Equity11.89B10.38B10.21B4.19B6.30B
Net debt-3.90B-6.73B-2.41B7.30B6.01B
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