

Porsche Automobil Holding SE (PAH3.XETRA) has spent the last five years oscillating between "deep value proxy on Volkswagen/Porsche AG" and "governance‑ and cycle‑risk discount", with narrative and price driven mainly by its holdings in Volkswagen and the 2022 IPO of Porsche AG. The current price of 36.81 sits near the lower half of the 5‑year range, consistent with a market that values the stake in VW/Porsche AG at a sizeable conglomerate and governance discount.
Over the last five years, PAH3's range has been roughly €30–€102, suggesting the stock has long functioned as a cyclical, highly leveraged way to play global autos through Volkswagen. In early 2020, the COVID‑19 demand collapse and production shutdowns hit global OEMs hard; as the majority owner of Volkswagen, Porsche SE sold off sharply with the sector and traded toward the lower end of the long‑term range.
The narrative shifted from "cheap holding with structural control premium" to something more cyclical—a proxy on global auto volumes and China, with investors worrying about dividend risk from Volkswagen. Through 2020, the stock experienced a violent drawdown followed by a sharp V‑shaped recovery as stimulus arrived, earnings proved better than feared, and resilient VW cash generation pulled the stock back into a broad €40–€60 band.
As auto demand and pricing power recovered in 2021, Porsche SE's earnings and book value per share rose strongly, with high EPS growth off the depressed 2020 base. The dominant event came in September 2022: the IPO and spin‑off of Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG (P911), with preferred shares listing in Frankfurt and valuing Porsche AG around €76 billion. Porsche SE took 25% of voting shares (12.5% of total) in addition to its VW stake, structurally increasing its direct exposure to the Porsche brand.
The investor narrative evolved to "sum‑of‑the‑parts unlock"—a holding company with stakes in both Volkswagen and newly listed Porsche AG, widely seen as undervalued versus the market value of those assets. On the chart, 2021 through early 2022 showed a strong uptrend toward the top of the 5‑year range, approaching the ~€100 area, followed by a sharp derating in 2022 as recession fears, cost inflation, and execution risk around the IPO weighed on autos and holding companies alike.
By 2023, Porsche SE was reporting solid but normalizing profitability; return on equity stayed clearly positive, though EPS growth slowed after the post‑COVID rebound and book value per share growth moderated. Rising rates, concerns about European industrial slowdown, and worries about EV investment burden at Volkswagen kept sentiment under pressure; PAH3's valuation compressed to very low P/E and P/B multiples versus global peers.
The narrative turned toward "value with hair" or "holding‑company discount": screens showed very low earnings multiples and attractive dividend yield, but investors remained wary of VW governance, capital allocation, and cyclical risk. Technically, the stock moved from its prior uptrend into a wide sideways‑to‑downward bias, roughly between the mid‑€30s and low‑€60s, with repeated failures to sustain breakouts as each macro or sector wobble triggered sell‑offs.
In 2024, reported metrics showed volatility, with a notable decline in cash‑flow per share versus the earlier peak years, reflecting pressures at core holdings. Porsche SE and its investments had to cope with slowing demand, higher financing costs, and intensifying EV competition; consensus P/E and P/B fell to very low levels (P/E low‑single‑digits, P/B well below 0.4), while dividend per share was reduced before modestly rising again in estimates.
The narrative increasingly framed Porsche SE as a "deep value" or "sum‑of‑the‑parts discount" story rather than a growth proxy: investors saw a cheap way to access VW and Porsche AG, but remained concerned about impairments, leverage, and capital intensity. On the chart, the share price drifted down within its multi‑year band; 1‑year extremes moved into roughly the €30–€40 area, indicating prolonged consolidation and failed rallies despite headline‑cheap valuation metrics.
By 2025, consensus data showed net income remaining positive but with estimate cuts. In November 2025, an explicit EPS downgrade for 2025 and 2026 reflected weaker earnings from core investments. Porsche SE continued to stress its long‑term controlling position in Volkswagen and Porsche AG; in March 2025, management publicly rejected speculation about selling down VW voting shares, reiterating commitment to the stake.
Investor perception tilted toward "cheap, leveraged holding with cyclical and governance risk": consensus rating sat around Hold, with average target price only modestly above the then‑current quote and high dividend yield seen as partial compensation. Technically, the stock spent 2025 largely in a low‑volatility sideways range in the mid‑€30s to around €40, near the lower half of its 5‑year range; 3‑year extremes showed a ceiling around €61.18 and a floor around €30.46, underscoring that the post‑pandemic uptrend had given way to a multi‑year range trade.
Into early 2026, with the price at 36.81, PAH3 remains valued at a steep discount to its look‑through holdings. The market still treats it as a value/sum‑of‑the‑parts story, influenced by Volkswagen's strategy, EV transition risks, and Porsche AG's performance rather than as a standalone growth equity.
Porsche Automobil Holding SE (PAH3.XETRA) is an investment holding company whose fortunes rise and fall almost entirely with its stakes in Volkswagen AG and Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG—two operators in brutally competitive global automotive markets. This means its real competition isn't other holding companies, but rather the large diversified auto groups and mobility-focused industrial investors all chasing the same capital, technology, and acquisition targets. The company also inherits the structural risks baked into automotive's transition: electrification, software-defined vehicles, tightening regulation. These aren't abstract concerns—they directly shape dividend capacity at both Volkswagen and Porsche AG. On top of that, PAH3 carries material legal, financing, and concentration risks that tend to amplify volatility compared to more diversified holdings.
Porsche Automobil Holding SE (PAH3.XETRA) is an investment holding company whose fortunes rise and fall with its controlling stake in Volkswagen Group and its significant interest in Porsche AG. Unlike traditional diversified holdings, its competitive position is essentially inseparable from the global automotive industry itself.[16][21][27] The main risks are straightforward: heavy concentration in European auto assets, the cyclical nature of global car demand, and the sheer capital required to transition to electric and software-defined vehicles.[16][21] Add to that the relentless competitive pressure from other major automakers worldwide, plus tightening regulatory demands around emissions, safety, and digital technologies, and you get a risk-return profile that's fundamentally tied to how well Volkswagen and Porsche execute against their global competitors.[16][22][21]
| Company | Ticker |
|---|---|
| Toyota Motor Corporation | 7203.TSE |
| Stellantis N.V. | STLA.NYSE |
| Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW Group) | BMW.XETRA |
| Mercedes-Benz Group AG | MBG.XETRA |
| General Motors Company | GM.NYSE |
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Start Free Trial| Period | Porsche Automobil Holding SE | vs DAX | vs S&P 500 (SPY) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1M | -0.84% | -1.83% | -0.87% |
| 3M | +0.35% | -6.82% | -2.09% |
| 6M | -0.05% | -4.63% | -7.28% |
| 1Y | +5.01% | -7.82% | -11.26% |
| 3Y | -19.11% | -84.45% | -100.05% |
| 5Y | -30.95% | -110.88% | -119.47% |
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Start Free TrialHow the company’s key valuation ratios (P/E, P/S, P/B and P/CF) have evolved over time compared to today.
| Period | P/E Ratio | P/S Ratio | P/B Ratio | P/CF Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current | -0.5 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 15.9 |
| 1Y ago | -0.6 | -0.6 | 0.3 | 7.8 |
| 3Y ago | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.3 | 21.5 |
| 5Y ago | 7.6 | 7.2 | 0.6 | 25.7 |
Long-term record of paid dividends (amount per share and dividend yield at the time of payment).
| Year | Dividend | Yield at payment | Avg. yield |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 1.91 EUR | 5.24% | 3.52% |
| 2024 | 2.56 EUR | 5.20% | |
| 2023 | 2.56 EUR | 4.64% | |
| 2022 | 2.56 EUR | 3.29% | |
| 2021 | 2.21 EUR | 2.39% | |
| 2020 | 2.21 EUR | 4.40% | |
| 2020 | 3.11 EUR | 6.81% | |
| 2019 | 2.21 EUR | 3.81% | |
| 2018 | 1.76 EUR | 2.51% | |
| 2017 | 1.01 EUR | 1.94% | |
| 2016 | 1.01 EUR | 2.39% | |
| 2015 | 2.01 EUR | 2.46% | |
| 2014 | 2.01 EUR | 2.50% | |
| 2013 | 2.01 EUR | 3.38% | |
| 2012 | 0.76 EUR | 1.91% |
Historical earnings performance shows how consistently the company meets or exceeds analyst expectations. Forward estimates provide insight into expected profitability and growth trajectory.
Selected income statement, balance sheet and cash flow figures. Annual and quarterly, based on reported IFRS/GAAP financials.
| 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | -19.85B | 5.21B | 5.28B | 2.98B | 107.00M |
| Operating income (EBIT) | -19.91B | 5.39B | 5.30B | 4.57B | 2.65B |
| Net income | -20.02B | 5.07B | 5.49B | 824.00M | 703.00M |
| Free cash flow | 1.43B | 1.87B | 791.00M | 733.00M | 771.00M |
| Total assets | 42.84B | 62.36B | 58.79B | 42.53B | 36.25B |
| Equity | 35.11B | 55.33B | 51.42B | 42.20B | 35.95B |
| Net debt | 5.88B | 6.23B | 7.01B | -271.00M | -221.00M |